Germany has long been seen as the EU’s “indispensable nation” – the biggest, richest and most consequential power. But in recent years Berlin has widely been regarded as missing in action in the EU, hobbled by internecine feuding in a coalition government that has caused flip-flops and delayed decisions.
Olaf Scholz has a cool relationship with Emmanuel Macron, slowing down the fabled Franco-German motor that powers the EU. The Polish-German relationship has also been rocky, strained by disputes over European air defence and historical grievances.
Friedrich Merz, on course to become Germany’s next chancellor, has promised to restore German leadership in Europe.
“I think Merz and his team understand the urgency of the global situation and that we need a functioning German government soon,” said Jana Puglierin, the head of the Berlin office at the European Council on Foreign Relations. “The situation is so urgent that we need to first agree on some fundamental principles to be able to speak with a voice in Brussels … of course, for the EU, the earlier the better.”
The rest of Europe is looking to the continent’s biggest economy to send more military aid to Ukraine. Merz, who has previously warned Scholz against “an appeasement policy” towards Russia, has promised to send Kyiv long-range Taurus cruise missiles long denied. He is also likely to face demands to send German troops to Ukraine as part of a deterrent or peacekeeping force, a discussion that Scholz described as “completely premature”.
Puglierin said there was consensus among mainstream parties that “we cannot throw Ukraine under the bus” but predicted “hard coalition negotiations” over funding aid “and that can, of course, paralyse support for Ukraine”.
Merz’s government will soon face calls to increase Germany’s defence spending to at least 3% of GDP at a Nato summit in June. Such demands will intensify pressure to reform Germany’s debt brake, which limits annual government borrowing to 0.35% of GDP. Many EU countries also want Berlin to reverse its opposition to pan-European borrowing for defence – so-called eurobonds. Despite his fiscally conservative economic stance, Merz has signalled openness to both options, but neither is a foregone conclusion.
Janis Emmanouilidis, deputy chief executive at the European Policy Centre, said Merz has been extremely careful not to say anything “which might cost him in his own party”, where many do not want debt-brake reform or eurobonds. It is “difficult to judge Merz’s room for manoeuvre” on the debt-brake, he said.
The centre-right leader is expected to dial down radical ideas from the campaign trail, such as permanent controls at the German border, as part of a five-point plan that included turning away all asylum seekers. Strict controls would damage relations with Germany’s neighbours. Poland’s prime minister, Donald Tusk, last year condemned controls introduced by Scholz’s government as “unacceptable”.
Emmanouilidis expects Merz to enjoy better relations with Tusk and Macron, although said it would be difficult for relations “not to get better”. Merz’s leadership style “indicates that he will be trying to play a stronger role” in contrast with Scholz’s “lack of boldness”, Emmanouilidis said, although “the devil will be in the detail”.
But the most testing leader for Merz will be Donald Trump, who in one month has upended the certainties of postwar German foreign policy – an icy reality for Merz’s Christian Democratic Union party, a traditional ally of the US Republican party. Since the US vice-president, JD Vance, met the far-right leader Alice Weidel and attacked European democracies, Merz, a lifelong transatlanticist, sounds less optimistic about striking deals with Trump, Puglierin said. “Germany is very sensitive to attacks on the EU … I think that this could lead to more openness to help make the EU work.”
